Research

Recently, I have been developing a new way of thinking about the value of species. I argue that nature's "irreplaceable designs" are a locus of final value. This approach delivers similar results to a species-centered account in many cases, but it is able to avoid some significant theoretical obstacles, and delivers better results in situations where the two diverge. At the moment, I'm focused on shoring up the theory itself and exploring its applications, especially in conservation biology.

I also work on issues at the intersection of metaethics and moral psychology, including normative skepticism, the evolution of morality, and the relationship between normative judgment and motivation.

Environmental Ethics

(2023) "Designing Species," Ethics and the Environment 28(2): 43-80.

(2020) "Irreplaceable Design: On the Non-Instrumental Value of Biological Variation," Ethics and the Environment 25(2): 45-72.

(2018) "Do Species Really Matter? The Case of 'The' Galápagos Giant Tortoise," Environmental Ethics 40(3): 241-260.

*The final publication is available at: https://www.pdcnet.org/enviroethics/content/enviroethics_2018_0040_0003_0241_0260

Metaethics/Moral Psychology

(forthcoming) "Some Hazards of Motivational Internalism: The Practical Case for Externalism," Inquiry.

*The Version of Record of this manuscript has been published and is available in Inquiry. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0020174X.2020.1724561

(2023) “Contingent Parasites and Exotic Amoralists: Dual-Process Cognitivism Undermines the Case for Deferred Internalism.” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14(3): 1005-1033.
*The final publication is available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13164-022-00618-0

(2020) "Big History, Value, and the Art of Continued Existence," Philosophia 48(3): 901-930.

*The final publication is available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11406-019-00124-1

(2018) "The Tale of a Moderate Normative Skeptic," Philosophical Studies 175(1):141-161.

*The final publication is available at: link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-017-0859-8

(2017) "Cognitivism, Motivation, and Dual-Process Approaches to Normative Judgment," Ergo 4(20): 579-609.

(2017) "Smith's Practicality Requirement Meets Dual-Process Models of Moral Judgment," Philosophical Psychology 30(8): 1043-1063.

*The Version of Record of this manuscript has been published and is available in Philosophical Psychology 30(8): 1043-1063. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09515089.2017.1333093

(2016) "Against Deliberative Indispensability as an Independent Guide to What There Is," Philosophical Studies 173(12): 3235-3254.

*The final publication is available at: link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-016-0661-z

(2015) "Moral Explanations, Thick and Thin," Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9(2): 1-21.

(2015) "Nativism and the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality," Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6(2): 231-253.

*The final publication is available at: link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13164-014-0207-2

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